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Recognition and emotions. A critical approach on education 




This paper is developed from the perspective of an integral education of persons, and its aim is to present a critical analysis of the 
role of education in forming autonomous citizens. Thus, this paper will show to what extent emotional education is a central 
element to consider in relation to the demands for recognition by individuals and communities in order to develop their own 
positive self-reference. With this aim, the paper develops an analytical-reconstructive methodology. In this regard, it will be 
displayed firstly how the positive recognition of people allows them to assert themselves as valuable individuals, endowed 
therefore with self-esteem. Secondly, it will be analyzed the importance of emotions concerning the development of these attitude 
of positive recognition. Finally, I will reflect on the relevance of emotional education in the formation of such attitudes of 
recognition as a substantial process for the development of both individual and social welfare. 
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1. Introduction 
The modern experience of reciprocity is inseparable from the new forms of interaction that introduce the vital and 
institutional demands, which in turn give rise today to an increasingly complex world. Thus, principles such as 
empathy, respect and recognition have come to constitute three critical experiences in modern and contemporary 
life. From this perspective, the voices calling for recognition of their identity (either individual or collective) do not 
seem to be able to be ignored. In this regard, much of the various theories put forward about the philosophy of 
recognition are characterized, ultimately, to affirm the intersubjective nature of human beings. 
This intersubjective nature of human beings and the social mediation in the formation of the Self seems to be, 
also, confirmed by social psychology. In this sense, this paper, that develops an analytical-reconstructive 
methodology, will take in consideration the very important role of recognition in the formation of the social Self. At 
the same time, the attitudes of recognition that empower individuals and social groups in order to reach a positive 
self-reference are needed, previously, of some kind of emotional tendency. This kind of emotions is what we can 
define, in the philosophical tradition of recognition, as moral emotions. 
Now, the question arises: What is the role of education in the formation of such attitudes of recognition? 
Education understood from the perspective of the integral human, that is, the integral education, can be especially 
useful in order to answer such a question. In this sense, the notion of integral education denotes, also, the concept of 
moral emotion, since the emotional is a constitutive element of the human essence itself. Therefore, education on 
moral emotions as a substantial part of an integral education, it may reveal the importance of educational processes 
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in the formation of these intersubjective relations of recognition that enrich the social structure, making it more 
morally just.  
2. The role of recognition in the formation of the Self 
the essential condition for the emergence of consciousness, of mind, of the objective world, of humans as organisms 
in possession of Selves 
constitutive element of subjective identity may be understood from a dynamic, as is clear from the contributions 
undertaken by cultural psychology (Bruner, 1996; Wertsch, 1999; Hermans, 2002). This dynamic view of the person 
as an agent in the construction of meanings is the basis of the socio-cultural notion of identity. 
Thus, the concept of identity can be understood, according to Bruner (1996), as a distributed self, product of the 
situations in which the person participates. 
In this sense, Hermans (2002) argues that identity is constructed through dialogue with multiple voices, so that 
this polyphony of voices sets a personal imaginary world, which is the key for the understanding of the dialogical 
self. Taylor (1996) notes also that identity emerges largely on the public recognition of the culture with which a 
the self-identity and the growth of self-esteem. And, also, Gergen (1992) states that without the complicity of the 
other which is often present before, during and after my action, this one would become meaningless. 
- - -definition 
arises from their participation in social settings and practices in which they are confronted with the opinions, beliefs 
and values of other individuals, groups and cultures. Identity understood as a personal construction emerging 
through dialogue and social interaction involves considering that identity is defined by the nature of these 
interactions and semiotic tools that people use to articulate them. In this way, identity is a dynamic heterogeneity of 
positions of the self in social settings. Holland, Lachicotte, Skinner and Cain (1998) argue that the ability to 
take/occupy social positions in relation to other identifiable individuals in figurative contexts is a key element in the 
 
From this dynamic conception of Self, identity is conceived as an emergent quality of actions in context, which 
involves paying attention to the relationship between these actions and the social and cultural settings in which the 
activities are developed (Cala and De la Mata, 2006). This means to focus attention on the agency, i.e. the actions of 
individuals for participating actively in the creation of both meanings and cultural and social practices. The person 
as an active agent is able to bond affectively with people, places and events, making them into cultural resources for 
his identity. The subjective and evaluative attitude from an emotional point of view of the action is an integral 
component of identity, since reflecting the individual approach taken by the person in a concrete situation of 
communication and the particular meanings constructed in that shared situation. 
From this perspective, the notion of agency is a key for the study of identity. So the human agency opens the way 
for the study of emotions in shaping identity by considering emotions as forms of actions more or less 
(un)intentional and (un)voluntary that people experience as a way of mediation in socio-cultural settings, in order to 
gain capacity and strength in the construction of social meanings. 
In this sense, it is highlighted how the individual and collective identity is constructed through implicit or explicit 
dialogue with others. The recognition, the non-recognition or the false recognition that the others project on me, 
determines how I understand what I was, what I am and what I want and can be, that is, the very notion of Self. 
Thus, the self-conception of an individual or a group is conditioned by the positive or negative interpretation that 
other individuals or groups have about them. 
Therefore, as revealed by Honneth (1994) in his formulation of a moral grammar of social conflicts, the 
continued positive recognition of the people who interact with a subject, allows asserting himself as a valuable 
individual who can build a dense private life and enrich the public life of his community. By contrast, the non-
recognition or the continually negative recognition of an individual makes him to internalize the disapproving 
glance that is projected at him. And that makes him to consider himself as an individual who has not and/or cannot 
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build a valuable project of life; and thus as a person who has nothing to contribute to the public sphere of the social 
conglomerate to which he belongs. 
The recognition of the other, then, seems to be a vital need for all humans. Without the recognition of those 
around us, our self-esteem weakens and, because of this situation, our capacity for self-construction and for 
participation in the public life of our society disappears or is reduced significantly. Moreover, as apparent from the 
very concept of agency as constitutive of the Self, moral emotions seem to acquire a substantial role in such an 
attitude of recognition. 
3. Moral Emotions 
The emotions is an important and very complex issue that has sparked a renewed philosophical interest because 
we do not conceive them anymore primarily as feelings or sensations that we sense as a mere passive receptors. On 
the contrary, we have begun to give emotions a rational component that allows us to examine the intricate 
relationships that they have with beliefs, desires and other attitudes. This means that we begin to recognize that 
emotions play a much more interesting role in explaining our actions in general, and especially in our moral life. 
Today we think it makes sense to talk about emotions, which, in certain circumstances, are rational, irrational, 
appropriate or inappropriate and perhaps also, about the ability of individuals to transform, manage and educate their 
emotions. It is therefore essential to adopt a cognitive and attitudinal approach about emotions, i.e., a theory that 
holds that beliefs and other attitudes such as desires and evaluations are needed for the emotions, form part of their 
structure, and allow us to identify the different emotions or specific cases of a given emotion. 
In any case, here it is not about thinking the question of whether a general theory of emotions exists, nor about 
what should be such a theory. Due to the wide range of mental states we call emotions, it seems not possible to 
specify a set of propositional attitudes necessary for all of them. However, we could assume that emotions have 
characteristic structures of propositional attitudes that are necessary for each of them and that distinguish them from 
each other. Anyway, adopting a cognitive approach does not mean to minimize the importance that, in specific 
cases, other aspects of emotions may have, like feelings, physiological changes or neurophysiological states. But 
they are issues which this paper does not try to deal with. 
According to the aim of this paper, there is a small group of emotions that can be especially highlighted: the 
moral emotions. These are emotions that can be considered moral because they require a complex set of concepts, 
beliefs and desires related to morality. Among them are: indignation, guilt, remorse, shame and, why not, love 
(Hansberg, 1996; Velleman, 1999). All these emotions, in fact, have a strong connection to the field of human 
morality, that is, with the quality of human actions. Not surprisingly, therefore, that recently some moral psychology 
theories have emphasized the role of emotions in models of moral development and conduct. 
In turn, moral emotions have been the focus of current researches in experimental psychology and neurosciences, 
finding that this kind of emotions (the moral ones) differ from other basic emotions like sadness, joy, anger, fear, 
surprise or disgust (Ekman, 1992), since moral emotions are intrinsically linked to both social and individual 
welfare. Moral emotions, thus, are evoked by the perception of moral violations, and it has been suggested that, in 
contrast to the laborious deductive reasoning, they appear quick and automatically, and that there exists an 
unconscious cognitive appraisal of interpersonal events (Haidt, 2002). 
However, the relevant from moral emotions is the role these play precisely in the attitudes of recognition of 
others. Therein lies the moral function of these emotions, while enabling the formation of positive relations of self-
reference by the other individuals and groups that make up the complex social framework. But regardless of whether 
moral emotions are given automatically and unconsciously or not, the fact is that, while they are understood from a 
cognitive perspective, individuals and citizens can be educated in such emotions since childhood. This implies the 
possibility of raising the moral level of society, for which, therefore, the same processes of formal and informal 
education must be understood from a holistic perspective. That is: it is manifested as an ethical requirement likewise 
for our societies to develop and establish integral education mechanisms that take into account, precisely, the 
importance of education in moral emotions. 
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4. Emotional Education as Education on (Moral) Emotions 
Education has traditionally been focused on the development of the intellect, with a marked neglect of the 
emotional. However, in all time it has been always raised the need for integral education considering that all human 
dimensions should be developed. This implies that cognitive development should be complemented with emotional 
development. On the other hand, education is a process characterized by the interpersonal relationship, which is 
imbued with emotional elements, and this requires paying attention to the emotions, since they have many 
influences on the educational process. However, as stated by Tapia (1998), emotional development of children has 
been largely and traditionally ignored by the school curricula. In this sense, deepening in the notion of an integral 
education (including moral emotions), means moving forward on the path of emotional education itself. 
Bisquerra (2000: 243) defines emotional education as: 
 
development as an essential complement of cognitive development. Both emotional and 
cognitive dimensions of individuals constitute the essential elements of an integral 
personality development. This proposes the development of knowledge and skills about 
emotions in order to enable the individual to better cope with challenges in everyday life. 
 
 
From this definition it follows that emotional education must be an intentional and systematic process. However, 
the traditional education usually left to chance the emotional education of citizens, what can have more or less 
disastrous consequences. Therefore, Greeberg (2000: 42) argues that if we want to teach the necessary skills for 
emotional intelligence, it will be also necessary fostering both in schools and homes the proper emotional 
environment to help people to develop emotionally, in the same sense that it already has been created physical 
environments for the corporeal and intellectual development. 
For his part, Goleman (1995) proposes as a possible solution to forge a new vision of the role to be played by 
schools in the education of the student, by reconciling in the classrooms the cognition with the emotion. In this 
sense, education should include some essentially human skills as self-knowledge, self-control, empathy and the art 
of listening, as well as solving conflicts and the collaboration with others. For authors such as Steiner and Perry 
understand the emotions, the ability to express them in a productive way and the ability to listen to others and feel 
 
In this sense, the skills displayed by the emotional education can be grouped into four blocks: the consciousness 
of one's self, the self-regulation, the motivation and the empathy. Self-awareness is the ability to recognize a feeling 
at the moment it appears. It means being attentive to our moods and reactions (thinking, physiological answers, 
overt behaviors ...) and relate them to the stimuli that trigger them. Voluntary expression of different emotions, their 
dramatization, is a way to learn them. On the other hand, when we are aware of our emotions we must learn to 
control them. It is not about repressing them, because they have a function, but balancing them. We do not have to 
avoid them to appear, but to control the time we are under their influence. The ability to calm oneself is a 
fundamental life skill and it is acquired as a result of the mediating action of others. Herein lies, therefore, self-
control. 
For its part, the motivation is the power of optimism, essential to achieve important goals. It is related to various 
psychological concepts such as impulse control (ability to withstand frustration, delay gratification), inhibition of 
negative thoughts (to successfully meet life challenges), attributional style for success and failure, and self-esteem 
(efficacy expectations). Finally, empathy is the experimentation of another person's emotional state, the ability to 
capture the emotional states of others and react appropriately socially. It has two components: the affective and 
cognitive. The affective component may be sufficient (young children are an example). In contrast, the cognitive 
cognitively, b
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emotion. In this latter sense, the moral emotions have an especially noteworthy relevance, since it is on them where 
it is based, precisely, the idea of the recognition as a requirement for positive construction of both the Self and the 
others' identity. 
In any case, on the issue of emotional education, Bisquerra (2001: 8) notes the need to differentiate what might 
be called affective education and education of affects. In this regard states: 
 
of affects. So far the affective dimension in education, or affective education, has been 
understood as putting affection in the educational process. Now it comes to educating the 
 
  
In this sense, emotional education should begin to be understood as education on emotions including especially 
those called moral emotions. That is: those that reinforce the attitudes of recognition as an essential element in the 
formation of the Self. 
 
5. Conclusion 
According to this paper, it can be argued that intersubjective relations of recognition are a substantial element in 
the formation of positive relations of self-reference, both by individuals and by social groups. Recognition 
relationships, socially mediated, therefore constitute a central element in creating the social Self. In this sense, 
emotions, which are an essential element of human nature, acquire a significant role in the establishment of such 
attitudes of recognition. Such emotions aimed at the formation of the Self and the social and individual identity is 
what we can call moral emotions. 
In addition, from a cognitive perspective of emotions, it has to be considered the need to go into an integral 
education in depth. That is, to develop models of emotional education. Through an emotional education that 
emphasizes especially in so-called moral emotions, the citizens of tomorrow could develop mutual and 
intersubjective relationships of recognition, what could also allow that citizens to develop open relationships of 
social solidarity. 
Therefore, emotional education understood as education on emotions (especially on moral emotions), should be 
assumed to respond to the social demands. In short, they are demands that claim the formation of citizens who are 
able to live in harmony with themselves and the others, to develop a positive self-concept that reaches high levels of 
welfare, and to contribute through relations of recognition (mediated by these moral emotions) to the building of a 
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